113年 - 113 國立臺北大學_碩士班一般入學考試試題_財政學系：經濟學#147760

1. 何謂 GDP 與 GNP？你認為在什麼樣的狀況下，一個國家的 GDP 會大於 GNP？(10%)

2. 在一個封閉的經濟體下，若政府透過加稅來支應擴張性的政府支出，對個人及國家整體儲蓄會有什麼影響，試分析說明。(10%)

3. 試分析說明 CPI 和 GDP deflator 的差異。(10%)

4. 試以 IS—LM 模型分析說明在浮動匯率制度下，當本國政府採取緊縮性的貨幣政策時，對本國及外國的均衡實質利率、產出、物價水準及匯率有何影響？(10%)

5. A closed economy is in a steady state with no productivity growth. Because of a disease outbreak, the working population and labor productivity decrease. According to the Solow model, what are the effects on steady-state capital per worker, output per worker, consumption per worker, and the long-run growth rate of the total capital stock? (10%)

6. Mike's uncompensated demand for candy is given by the equation $Q = 15/p^2$, where Q is the quantity of candy and $p$ is the price. Suppose that the price of candy rises from $1 to $3. Please compute the change in consumer surplus. (5%)

7. Suppose a monopoly can produce any level of output it wishes at a constant marginal (and average) cost of $5 per unit. Assume the monopoly sells its goods in two different markets separated by some distance. The demand curve in the first market is given by

$$Q_1 = 55 - P_1,$$

and the demand curve in the second market is given by

$$Q_2 = 70 - 2P_2,$$

Assume this monopolist could maintain the separation between the two markets (no arbitrage at all). What are the total profits in this situation? (8%)

8. Assume that a competitive firm's short-run total cost curve is $TC = Q^3 - 6Q^2 + 15Q + 20$. What is this firm's short-run shutdown price? (5%)

a. Solve for Lionel's optimal choices and demonstrate how they change with \( \alpha \). (6%)

b. Solve for Lionel's optimal choices under an income tax rate \( t \). How do his choices change if there is a charitable deduction (so income spent on charitable donations, \( c_{2} \), is not taxed)? Does the charitable deduction have a bigger incentive effect on more or less altruistic people? Compare your result to the no-tax case. (12%)

10. Suppose the demand for pizza in a small isolated town is p = 10 - Q. There are only two firms, A and B, and each has a cost function $TC_A = 2 + q_A$ and $TC_B = 2 + q_B$ respectively. Compare the firms' profits if they behave as Cournot duopolists with their profits if they form a cartel and share the market equally. (14%)